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Abstract
The unreliability evaluation of a system including dependencies involv-
ing the state of components or the failure events, can be performed by mod-
elling the system as a Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT). The combinatorial tech-
nique used to solve standard Fault Trees is not suitable for the analysis of a
DFT. The conversion into a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) is a way to
analyze a DFT. This paper presents a software tool allowing the automatic
analysis of a DFT exploiting its conversion to a DBN. First, the architecture
of the tool is described, together with the rules implemented in the tool, to
convert dynamic gates in DBNs. Then, the tool is tested on a case of sys-
tem: its DFT model and the corresponding DBN are provided and analyzed
by means of the tool. The obtained unreliability results are compared with
those returned by other tools, in order to verify their correctness. Moreover,
the use of DBNs allows to compute further results on the model, such as
diagnostic and sensitivity indices.
1 Introduction
The modeling possibilities offered by Fault Trees (FT), one of the most popu-
lar techniques for dependability analysis of large, safety critical systems, can be
extended by relying on Bayesian Networks (BN) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
This formalism allows to relax some constraints which are typical of FT,
such as the hypothesis that elementary events are always modeled as binary ob-
jects (working/failed), are probabilistically independent, and interact just through
Boolean AND/OR connections. In [1], it has been shown how FT can be directly
mapped into BN, and that the basic inference techniques on the latter may be used
to obtain classical parameters computed from the former. In addition, BN allow
to represent local dependencies and to perform both predictive and diagnostic rea-
soning.
In [6], we have shown how BN can provide a unified framework in which also
Dynamic FT (DFT) [7, 8], a rather recent extensions able to treat complex types
of dependencies, can be represented.
In particular, dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) introduce four basic (dynamic) gates:
the warm spare (WSP), the sequence enforcing (SEQ), the probabilistic depen-
dency (PDEP) and the priority AND (PAND) gate. WSP are dynamic gates mod-
eling one or more principal components that can be substituted by one or more
backups (spares), with the same functionality (Fig. 1(a)). The WSP gate fails
when the number of operational powered spares and/or principal components is
less than the minimum required. Spares can fail even while they are dormant, but
the failure rate of an unpowered spare is lower than the failure rate of the cor-
responding powered one. More precisely, being
 
the failure rate of a powered
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Figure 1: Dynamic gates in a DFT.
spare, the failure rate of the unpowered spare is 
 
, with  called the
dormancy factor. Spares are more properly called ”hot” if 
	 and ”cold” if
	 .
A SEQ gate forces its inputs to fail in a particular order: when a SEQ is found
in a DFT, it never happens that the failure sequence takes place in different orders.
SEQ gates can be modeled as a special case of a cold spare [8], so they will
not be considered any more in the following1. In the PDEP gate (Fig. 1(b)),
one trigger event T causes other dependent components to become unusable or
inaccessible with probability   . In particular, when the trigger event
occurs, the dependent components will fail with the specified probability. The
separate failure of a dependent component, on the other hand, has no effect on
the trigger event. PDEP has also a non-dependent output, that simply reflects the
status of the trigger event.
Finally, the PAND gate reaches a failure state iff all of its input components
have failed in a preassigned order (from left to right in graphical notation). While
the SEQ gate allows the events to occur only in a preassigned order and states that
a different failure sequence can never take place, the PAND does not force such
a strong assumption: it simply detects the failure order and fails just in one case
(in Fig. 1(c) a failure occurs iff A fails before B, but B may fail before A without
producing a failure in G).
The quantitative analysis of DFT typically requires to expand the model in
its state space, and to solve the corresponding Continuous Time Markov Chain
(CTMC) [7]. Through a process known as modularization [9, 10, 11], it is possible
to identify the independent sub-trees with dynamic gates, and to use a different
Markov model (much smaller than the model corresponding to the entire FT) for
1The conceptual difference between the two kind of gates is that the inputs to a SEQ do not
need to be a component and its set of spares, but can be components covering any kind of function
in the FT.
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each of them. Nevertheless, there still exists the problem of state explosion.
In order to alleviate this limitation, as stated above, we have proposed a trans-
lation of the DFT into a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN). A DBN is a discrete
time model where the system is represented at several time slices, and conditional
dependencies among variables at different slices are introduced, to capture the
temporal evolution [12, 13, 14]. When the Markov assumption holds (and in par-
ticular when we are dealing with a first order Markov process) the future slice at
time  is conditionally independent of the past ones given the present slice
at time  [15]. In this case, it is sufficient to represent two consecutive time slices
and the network is fully specified if it is provided with:
1. the prior probabilities for root variables at time ff	fi ;
2. the intra-slice conditional dependency model, together with the correspond-
ing Conditional Probability Tables (CPT);
3. the inter-slice conditional dependency model and probability tables (i.e. the
transition model), which explicit the temporal probabilistic dependencies
between variables. In particular, a variable at time flffi may depend not
only on its ”historical” copy (i.e. on the same variable at time  ), but also
on the values of other variables in the previous time slice.
With respect to CTMC, the use of a DBN allows one to take advantage of the
factorization in the temporal probability model. As a matter of fact, the condi-
tional independence assumptions enables a compact representation of the proba-
bilistic model, allowing the system designer or analyst to avoid the complexity of
specifying and using a global-state model (like a standard Markov Chain) when
the dynamic module of the considered FT is significantly large. In this paper, we
describe a tool we have implemented to realize an automatic translation of a DFT
into the corresponding DBN. The tool embeds an algorithm able to independently
convert the different kinds of dynamic gates that may be found in a FT into a
DBN, and then to build the overall network by linking the single DBN taking into
account the types of connections that can exist among the gates themselves. The
tool is provided with a user-friendly graphical interface, through which the user
can draw the DFT in input, and then ask for the translation (or draw the DBN
directly). Diagnostic and/or predictive computation can then be performed on the
DBN, by resorting to standard algorithms (either exact or approximate) available
for DBN, exploiting the factorization of the resulting probabilistic model. We also
show an application of the tool functionalities to a real world example.
Our experimental results demonstrate how DBN can be safely resorted to if
a quantitative analysis of the system is required. Moreover, the tool offers the
possibility of drawing the system model relying on the more diffused FT language,
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and of analyzing the model by means of the more powerful DBN. Finally, the
exploitation of a DBN allows to obtain quantitative analysis results in a reasonable
time, shorter with respect to DFT.
2 The DBNet tool
2.1 Tool functionalities
The tool we have implemented is called DBNet and allows the user to:
1. edit a (dynamic) Bayesian network and draw inferences on it;
2. edit a dynamic fault tree;
3. automatically convert a DFT into the corresponding DBN, on which both
predictive and diagnostic inference can then be drawn.
Items (1) and (2) are described below; item (3), which represents the core con-
tribution of this paper, is extensively treated in sections 2.2 and 2.3. The tool
architecture is depicted in Fig. 2.
2.1.1 Editing a dynamic Bayesian network
By means of the tool graphical interface, which has been built relying on the
Draw-Net graphical tool [16, 17], the user is allowed to draw the intra-slice con-
ditional dependency model at time  , to duplicate it at time   , and finally
to provide the inter-slice conditional dependency model. The term  is the dis-
cretization step, and can be set by the user trough the graphical interface. CPT
can be easily inserted relying on a user friendly functionality, in which every row
is automatically completed by calculating the last entry as the difference between
1 and the sum of the other values.
Additionally, it is possible to identify query nodes (not necessarily the Top
Event (TE) i.e. the global system failure, as usually required in FT analysis), and
to provide a stream of observations, each one coupled with its observation time.
When the network has been fully characterized, the user can activate a moni-
toring procedure, i.e. ask for the calculation of the probability of the query node(s)
from the initial time "! to the mission time $# , given a certain discretization step,
and given the observation stream if available. The calculation of the TE is a spe-
cial case of monitoring, with an empty stream of observations. In addition to the
output of classical FT analysis, on the Bayesian network smoothing can be re-
quired as well. In this case, the past history of the system is rebuilt, on the basis
5
Figure 2: The DBNet tool architecture.
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of the stream of observations. This procedure allows to obtain diagnostic knowl-
edge (e.g. given that the TE has been observed, the probability of failure of basic
components is queried).
Algorithms for monitoring and smoothing on DBN [14] have been imple-
mented by resorting to Intel PNL (Probabilistic Networks Library), a set of open-
source C++ libraries (see http://www.intel.com/research/mrl/pnl), to which we
have provided some minor adjustments. PNL includes two classes of algorithms:
the first class is composed by exact algorithms, based on the calculation of the
junction tree; the second class includes parameterized algorithms, which require
to cluster the overall network in a set of subprocesses.
Subprocesses are then solved independently, thus speeding up the computation
time. The algorithms provide the exact result if the clusters have been correctly
identified, i.e. if every subprocess evolves independently of the others; an algo-
rithm to automatically find the correct clusters could be implemented as well.
2.1.2 Editing a dynamic Fault Tree
Modelling the failure mode of a system as a DBN might be complicated for the
user, while drawing the DFT model and generating automatically the correspond-
ing DBN, is more practical. In this way, the DFT becomes an high level formal-
ism allowing the user to express in a straightforward way the relations between
the components in the failure mode of the system, whose modelling in terms of
DBN primitives would be less comfortable.
Draw-Net already included a DFT editor. We have ameliorated it by providing
the possibility of drawing dynamic gates, and of indicating query variables and
observed variables. On the DFT, the user can also specify the discretization step,
as well as the mission time, and the inference algorithm to be adopted on the
corresponding DBN.
This information is directly inherited by the corresponding DBN when trans-
lation is required. In this way, the DFT is exploited as an easy and well known
formalism, to which the user is typically already familiar, through which all the
needed data for DBN inference can be given in input. In the future, we plan to ex-
tend these capabilities, by adding ad hoc structures to the DFT, which can then be
naturally characterized in the corresponding DBN: for example, we will allow the
insertion of multi-valued nodes, and the specification of conditional dependencies
among basic events. Moreover, we plan to automatically calculate the clusters
to be exploited by the approximated inference algorithms, by a modularization
procedure on the DFT [11].
The DBN structure corresponding to the DFT, as well as all the CPT are then
automatically generated by the tool, and (forward or backward) inference can be
finally executed. In the next section we describe the details of the translation
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Figure 3: DBN for the WSP gate.
procedure.
2.2 Translating dynamic gates
In this section, we present the conversion of each dynamic gate (WSP, PDEP,
PAND) in the corresponding DBN. The rules to convert Boolean gates (AND,
OR, K out of N) can be found in [1].
2.2.1 Warm spare gate
In a DFT, different configurations of warm spares can be designed. Of particular
interest are those in which the same pool of spares is shared across a set of WSP. In
this case, each principal component is allowed to request the items in the pool in a
precise order - if more than one is still dormant. As an example, let us consider a
situation where two components A and B can be substituted by two spares S1 and
S2. In particular, S1 is B’s spare, and will substitute A only if: (i) B is working,
and (ii) S2 is failed. If B fails, it will request the activation of S1, and only if it
is unavailable it will activate S2. S2 is A’s spare: analogous considerations hold.
Every gate fails iff its principal component and all the available (i.e. working
and dormant) spares in the pool fail. The DBN corresponding to this situation is
shown in Fig. 3.
It can be observed that each component node at time ff  depends on its
copy at time  (we consider persistence of faults). Moreover, each spare depends
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on the two principal components, and on the other spare. Each spare is modeled
as a stochastic variable assuming four values, namely: dormant, operative on A,
operative on B and failed. If both principal components are working, each spare
maintains a failure rate equal to 
 
at time %&' . On the other hand, if B is down,
S1 switches to a failure rate equal to
 
(since the spare is now in the active mode);
the same happens if B is working, but A and S2 are both failed. S2 works dually
on its principal component A. Each WSP gate (in the example, the one having
A as its principal component, and the one having B as its principal component)
is modeled as a deterministic AND node among its three inputs: the principal
components and the two spares in the pool. The overall set of WSP sharing the
pool can be modeled as a (*),+ gate (2:4 in the example), where + is the number
of principal components and of available spares in the pool, and ( is equal to the
number of WSP gates sharing the spares.
2.2.2 Probabilistic dependency gate
Since the trigger event of a PDEP gate determines with a given probability, an
immediate failure of its dependent components, a subsystem including a PDEP
can be completely characterized resorting to intra-slice (i.e. static) conditional
dependencies. Nevertheless, exploiting a dynamic network allows us to resort to
a common framework for dynamic gates representation.
Fig. 4 shows the DBN for a PDEP gate in a configuration in which the trigger
event T has two dependent components A and B. As usual, each component at
time -ffi depends on the component itself at time  . Moreover, the dependent
components will fail (with probability  ) if the trigger has failed in the same
time slice.
2.2.3 Priority AND
PAND gates model situations where a control component may prevent the system
to crash (with ruinous consequences) because of the failure of a standard compo-
nent. In such cases, a failure of the control component before the failure of the
standard one prevents the recovery action of the control component, leading to a
(sub)-system failure. Consider the gate of Fig. 1(c): we can model the failure
sequence by introducing a new stochastic variable PF, that explicitly keeps track
of the order in which A and B fail. PF at time ./ depends on all the variables
at time  . In particular, if it was already failed at time  , it will remain failed at
time 01 . It will also fail iff A(t)=1 and B(t)=0, i.e. A fails before B. The PAND
gate is modeled as a logic AND among its three inputs A, B and PF at time 23 .
Fig. 5 shows the resulting DBN. An hypothesis on how to deal with contemporary
faults of A and B has to be made; for example, we have made the choice that a
9
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Figure 4: DBN for the PDEP gate.
contemporary fault sets PF( 24 ) to 1, and therefore leads to a fault of the whole
gate.
2.3 Combining the modules into a single DBN
The three gates we have examined in the previous section can be connected, in
order to build a complex DFT. To understand what combinations can be modeled,
and how we can provide an automatic translation of the DFT into the correspond-
ing DBN, we have to recall how the gates themselves are meant to be applied.
In particular, according to [8]:
1. the dependent events of a PDEP can only be basic events, which could be
the input of another dynamic gate;
2. WSP can have only basic events as an input, and two or more spare gates
can share some spare components; a set of WSP sharing a pool of spares
are treated as a single module for translation (see section 2.2);
3. PAND can have basic events or spare gates as an input; two or more PAND
can also be combined in a cascade manner.
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These simplifications let us derive a general algorithm for building the DBN
corresponding to the overall DFT. The procedure follows a modular approach, in
the sense that it builds the output DBN by combining the various DBN corre-
sponding to the different gates.
Consider a pair of dynamic gates G1 and G2. Let B be the output of G1 (or
an event triggered by G1 if G1 is a PDEP), and an input to G2 (B is therefore the
element connecting the two gates). The algorithm works as follows:
1. generate independently DBN1 and DBN2 for G1 and G2 respectively, along
the lines explained in section 2.2;
2. connect the two networks in correspondence of the nodes they share; when
new arcs enter a node, an adjustment to its CPT is required, as follows:
a. add all the parents derived from DBN1 and DBN2 as columns in the new
CPT;
b. in every entry of the table, set the probability of failure of the node to the
maximum between the corresponding entries of the CPT in DBN1 and
in DBN2. In this way the strongest effect on the probability of failure
of the shared component is always considered.
3. repeat the above step for every shared node between the two networks (more
nodes could be shared e.g. when G1 is a PDEP, and it triggers more than
one input to G2).
11
Figure 6: The scheme of the multiprocessor computing system.
As a final remark, recall that in section 1, we have cleared that SEQ can be
treated as cold spares. In [8], on the other hand, it is explained that SEQ can
receive also WSP and PAND in input, determining a difference in the gates be-
havior.
Anyway, note that our algorithm would not change if we removed the hypoth-
esis that cold spares can have only basic events as an input: therefore we do not
need to explicitly reintroduce SEQ gates in our framework, and our algorithm
appears to be general enough to cover all the modeling possibilities.
3 An example
In this section, an example is reported in order to show how it is possible to convert
a DFT model in a DBN and to perform the unreliability evaluation on it.
3.1 Description of the example
The example is inspired from [18] and consists of a multiprocessor computing
system; it is composed by two computing module: CM1 and CM2. Each of them
contains one processor, one memory and two hard disks: a primary and a backup
disk. In the case of CM1, they are respectively indicated as P1, M1, D11, D12. In
the case of CM2, they are: P2, M2, D21, D22 (see Fig. 6).
Initially, the primary disk is accessed by the computing modules to store and
retrieve programs and data, while the backup disk contains the copy of the in-
formation inside the primary disk, and is accessed only periodically for update
operations. For this reason, in this situation, the failure rate of the backup disk
is lower than the failure rate of the primary one. If the primary disk fails, it is
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replaced in its function by the backup disk; from this moment, the failure rate of
the backup disk is equal to the failure rate of the primary one. In other words, the
backup disk of a computing module, is the spare of the primary disk.
A spare memory (M3) is present in the system; its aim is replacing M1 or M2
in the case of failure. Moreover, the computing modules are connected by means
of the bus N. Finally, both P1 and P2 are functionally dependent on the power
supply PS; this means that the failure of PS forces the failure of P1 and P2.
3.2 The failure mode of the system and its DFT model
The whole system fails if the bus N fails preventing the connection between the
computing modules, or if both of them are failed. This is represented in the DFT
model of the system (Fig. 7), by the Top Event (TE) which is the output of an OR
gate having these input events: the basic event N, relative to the bus, and the event
S indicating the failure of both computing modules. S is the output of an AND
gate whose input events are CM1 and CM2.
A computing module fails if both disks are failed, or if the processor is failed,
or if the internal memory is failed and it can not be replaced by M3 because M3
is failed too, or it is already replacing the internal memory of the other computing
module. So, in the DFT model, CM1 is the output of an OR gate having the events
Disk1, P1 and Mem1 as input events; such events correspond respectively to the
conditions determining the failure of a computing module. The event Disk1 is
the output of a WSP gate having the basic event D11 as main component and the
basic event D12 as spare component; the event Mem1 is the output of a WSP gate
whose input events are M1 (main component) and M3 (spare component).
The failure of CM2 is modelled in the DFT model in a similar way, by the
subtree rooted in the event CM2 which is symmetric to the subtree whose root
is CM1. The basic event M3 is connected to two WSP gates since it can replace
either M1 or M2.
The functional dependency of P1 and P2 on PS, is modelled by a PDEP gate
whose probability is equal to 1, and having PS as trigger event, and the basic
events P1 and P2 as dependent events.
The time to fail of any component in the system is a random variable ruled
by the negative exponential distribution; Tab. 1 shows the failure rate of every
component, together with the dormancy factors of the spare components. Fig.
7 has been drawn by means of the graphical interface of our tool, described in
section 3.5.
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Figure 7: The DFT model of the multiprocessor computing system.
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Component Failure rate
 
( 57698 ) Dormancy factor 
N 2.0E-9
P1, P2 5.0E-7
PS 6.0E-6
D11, D21 8.0E-5
D12, D22 8.0E-5 0.5
M1, M2 3.0E-8
M3 3.0E-8 0.5
Table 1: The failure rates and the dormancy factors.
3.3 Conversion of the DFT model to a DBN
In order to perform the unreliability evaluation of the system through its DFT
model, in our approach we convert it to a DBN. The DBN corresponding to the
DFT in Fig. 7, is shown in Fig. 8 and can be automatically generated given the
DFT model, by using our tool.
The nodes inside the DBN derive from the translation of the basic events and
of the gates (both static and dynamic) inside the DFT; the translation of the internal
events and of the top event, is not necessary [1]. The DBN nodes are duplicated
for each time slice (  , :; ) according to the 2TBN representation [14]. Temporal
arcs (drawn as thicker lines) connect the nodes representing the temporal copies
of the same basic event; in this way, we model the failure persistence allowing the
possibility of representing also repair processes.
For instance, the WSP gate in Fig. 7 having D21, D22 as input events, and
Disk2 as output event, corresponds in the DBN in Fig. 8, to the subnet composed
by the nodes D21, D21_1, D22, D22_1, Disk2_1, together with the arcs connect-
ing such nodes.
3.4 Unreliability results
After the conversion of the DFT in a DBN, we can perform the analysis of the
latter by means of our tool. Tab. 2 shows the unreliability of the system versus the
mission time varying between 1000 and 5000 hours ( 	<%5 ), obtained by mon-
itoring the node TE_1 without the observation stream for each node; this method
is equivalent to the prediction. The obtained results have been successfully veri-
fied by comparison with the results returned by other tools run on the same DFT
model. Such tools are DRPFTproc [19, 20] (based on modularization [11] and
conversion to Stochastic Petri Nets of dynamic gates) and Galileo [21, 22] (based
on modularization, Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) [23, 24] and CTMCs). Tab.
15
Figure 8: The DBN corresponding to the DFT in Fig. 7.
2 reports also the results obtained using such tools.
The use of DBNs allows to compute further results based on the conditional
probability, such as diagnostic and sensitivity indices [25].
3.5 Graphical interface description
Fig. 9 shows a screenshot of the graphical interface (Draw-Net) of our tool. It is
mainly composed by three windows; the main window allows the user to draw the
DFT model, while in the window named Property Page, it is possible to set the
attributes of the node or of the arc currently selected in the main window. From
the Execute menu of the main window, the user can run the conversion and the
analysis of the DFT model. At the end of such process, the obtained results are
displayed in the window called Solver Execution.
16
Figure 9: A screenshot of the DBNet tool.
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time (h) DBNet DRPFTproc Galileo
1000 0.0060086 0.0060088 0.0060088
2000 0.0122452 0.0122455 0.0122455
3000 0.0191820 0.0191832 0.0191832
4000 0.0273523 0.0273548 0.0273548
5000 0.0372379 0.0372413 0.0372413
Table 2: The unreliability results.
4 Conclusions
Bayesian Networks provide a robust probabilistic method for reasoning under un-
certainty and are becoming widely used in several real world applications. In
previous works, we have analyzed the possibility of translating FT into the frame-
work of BN. We have also shown how FT with dynamic gates, a recent extension
to traditional FT that allows to model complex dependency types, can be char-
acterized in the framework of BN as well. In particular, we have shown how to
translate a dynamic FT into a dynamic BN.
Resorting to the DBN formalism has the well-known advantages of exploiting
all the modeling capabilities of graphical probabilistic models: multi-valued vari-
ables (instead of binary events), local dependencies among components (instead
of classical s-independence assumption), noisy interaction among component be-
havior (instead of deterministic interaction).
In addition, general inference mechanism (combining prediction as well as
diagnosis) can be naturally performed on a DBN, while they are not easily imple-
mented in standard FT analysis, especially if evidence is gathered during analysis
itself.
Finally, with respect to the use of CTMC, which are traditionally resorted to
in order to solve dynamic FT, DBN allow to take advantage of the sparseness in
the temporal probability model, and to rely on approximate inference algorithms,
thus reducing the computation time.
In this paper, we have described a tool that allows the user to draw a DBN
and to ask for diagnostic or predictive inference on it, as well as to draw a DFT,
obtain an automatic conversion into the corresponding DBN, and ask for inference
calculation.
To test both the proposed conversion methodology and the tool performances,
we have run some examples, one of which has been presented in this paper: the
results obtained using the DBN are basically identical to the ones obtained using
other analysis techniques described in the literature. Our experimental results
therefore demonstrate how DBN can be safely resorted to if a quantitative analysis
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of the system is required.
In the future, we plan to extend the tool capabilities, by adding ad hoc struc-
tures to the DFT, which can then be naturally characterized in the corresponding
DBN.
In this way, the tool will offer the possibility of drawing the system model
relying on the well known and more diffused FT language, and of analyzing the
model itself by means of the more powerful DBN.
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